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Abstract.
We propose an duopoly game where quantity-setting ￿rms have incomplete information about
the demand function. In each time step, they solve a pro￿t maximization problem assuming a
linear local approximation of the demand function. In particular, we construct an example using
the well known duopoly Puu￿ s model with isoelastic demand function and constant marginal
costs. An explicit form of the dynamical system that describes the time evolution of the duopoly
game with boundedly rational players is given. The main result is the global stability of the
system.
JEL Classi￿cation: L13; D83; C61; C621 Introduction
An oligopoly is a market structure between the two extreme cases of monopoly and of perfect
competition; from a theoretical point of view, Cournot, in 1838 [2] has introduced the ￿rst formal
theory of oligopoly and the duopolistic Cournot model is one of the most well know subjects of
economic dynamics.
Often, in a static setting, the model is solved using the notion of Nash equilibrium, this kind
of solution in market games implies that each ￿rms knows the entire demand curve of the good
it produces, has perfect foresight about the next period production of the other ￿rms operating
in the same market; from a computational point of view, Nash equilibrium implies also that the
players are able to solve a one period optimization problem.
In 1978 Rand [7] and Poston and Steward [4], in a dynamic setting based on the reaction
functions, showed that, under suitable conditions, simple duopoly would lead to complex dy-
namic phenomena. The dynamical complexity arises from the unimodal character of the reaction
function, i.e., the curve that shows how to react, in the optimal way, with respect to the past
strategy of the competitor. In the last two paper, the reaction functions are not derived from
the solution of an optimization problem but are proposed by the authors in an exogenous and
abstract way.
In 1991 Puu [5] suggested the ￿rst example of duopolistic model with unimodal reaction
functions, derived from the optimization of pro￿t functions, that gives rise to complex phenom-
ena. It is assumed an isoelastic demand function, which always arises when the consumer have
Cobb￿ Douglas preferences type, combined with constant marginal costs. The model was shown
to produce a period doubling sequence of ￿ ip bifurcations ending in chaos for the outputs of
each of the two competitors.
Since then, many contributions has been proposed in order to enrich the simple economic
assumptions of the Cournot original model. Among numerous references listed in [6] and in
[8], the reader can ￿nd many di⁄erent examples of the Cournot oligopoly game with complex
dynamics.
This paper investigates a learning duopoly model; the oligopolists do not know the demand
function they face, but they believe it is linear and they estimate such a linear function through
the knowledge of the current market state in terms of quantity and price and on the basis of local
knowledge of the demand curve. This adjustment process was introduced by Tuinstra [9], and
Bischi et al. [1], Naimzada and Sbragia [3] who analyzed it for price-setting and quantity-setting
1oligopolies, respectively.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamic behavior of a duopoly game with
two ￿rms learning about the demand curve through the local linear approximation process; to
this end, we will use Puu￿ s model and demonstrate our main result; the discrete dynamical system
that arises considering two boundedly rational players that use local linear approximation, is
globally stable. The plan of the paper is as follows: In section 2, is constructed and described
Puu￿ s simple nonlinear duopoly model . In Section 3, is presented a duopoly model with isoelastic
demand curve and constant marginal costs and local linear approximation of the demand curve.
In section 4, the dynamics of a duopoly game with boundedly rational player is analyzed. Section
5 considers an example in which is analyzed numerically and graphically the evolution of the
quantities chosen by the oligopolists. In section 6 we compare the expected pro￿ts of the ￿rms
in the two di⁄erent settings, the one with global knowledge and the one with local knowledge.
2 The Puu model






The (1) represents an isoelastic demand function, because the elasticity of the demand is
constant. In the duopoly case there are two ￿rms (￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2) producing two perfect
substitute goods (q1 and q2). Under the assumption that total demand is equal to total supply,
we know that Q = q1 + q2.
Analyzing the nonlinear Cournot output adjustment, we know that at period t+1; each ￿rm
produces a quantity of good that depends on the expected price for the period, which depends
on the quantities produced by both the duopolists. So, each ￿rm has to make an expectation
on the competitor￿ s production. In this way ￿rm 1 produces a quantity q1(t + 1), given the
expected production of ￿rm 2 (qe
2(t + 1) ), whereas ￿rm 2 produces a quantity q2(t + 1), given
the expected production of ￿rm 1 (qe
1(t + 1)). The chosen quantities q1(t + 1) and q2(t + 1) are
such that ￿rms maximize their expected pro￿ts that are (under the assumption of linear costs):
￿e
1(t + 1) =
q1(t + 1)
q1(t + 1) + qe
2(t + 1)
￿ c1q1(t + 1)
￿e
2(t + 1) =
q2(t + 1)
q2(t + 1) + qe
1(t + 1)
￿ c2q2(t + 1)
(2)
2where c1 and c2 are the marginal costs of the ￿rms 1 and 2 respectively.
Maximizing pro￿ts using na￿ve expectations (i.e. qe
1(t + 1) = q1(t) and qe
2(t + 1) = q2(t)) we

























(c1 + c2)2 ; qc
2 =
c1
(c1 + c2)2 (4)




















The results (5) permit to conclude that (under the assumptions of isoelastic demand function,
linear costs and na￿ve expectations):
Theorem 1 At the Cournot point the more e¢ cient ￿rm obtain an higher pro￿t and produces
more output than the other one
In the theorem the terms ￿more e¢ cient￿indicate the ￿rm whose marginal cost is lower, in
fact:






















Trace and determinant of Jc (Tr(Jc) and Det(Jc)) are 1 and (c1 ￿ c2)2=4c1c2 respectively.
The eigenvalues (￿1;2) are the solutions of the characteristic equation ￿2 ￿ Tr(Jc)￿ + Det(Jc)
and the Cournot point is stable if the absolute value of both the eigenvalues are lower than one.






< (3 + 2
p
2) (8)
3The condition (8) implies that in the special case of c1 = c2 the Cournot point is stable.
When the condition (8) is violated, the Cournot point is unstable and increasing the ratio c2=c1
we can observe the period doubling sequence of bifurcations leading to chaos.
3 The conjectured demand function
In this section we propose the boundedly rational adjustment process in which we will analyze
the evolution of the quantities chosen by the oligopolists. Firms produce homogeneous products
and the price depends on the total output of the industry according to the inverse demand
function:
p(t) = f(Q(t)) (9)
where Q(t) =
Pn
j=1 qj is the total output of the oligopoly market and n is the number of the
oligopolistic ￿rms operating in the market.
The inverse demand function satis￿es the canonical conditions about demand: f(Q(t)) > 0
and f0(Q(t) ￿ 0, with Q > 0.
The total costs functions are linear: TCi = ciqi with ci > 0 and i = 1;:::;n and where ci
represents the marginal cost of the i-th ￿rm.
In time period t each ￿rm through the local knowledge of the demand function de￿nes the
conjectured demand function and then the ￿rm will optimize the expected pro￿ts.
The local knowledge of the demand function means that the ￿rm knows the current market
price, p(t), the corresponding quantity Q(t), produced by the ￿rms and demanded by the market
and, through market experiments, the local linear approximation of the demand function in the
point represented by the current price and by the current quantity produced, (p(t);Q(t)). These
elements are su¢ cient for the local approximation of the demand function; we can de￿ne the
conjectured demand for the next period t + 1:
pe
i(t + 1) = p(t) + f0(Q(t))(Qe(t + 1) ￿ Q(t)) (10)
where Qe(t+1) represents the aggregate conjectured production for time t+1. Then using the
demand function we obtain:
pe
i(t + 1) = f(Q(t)) + f0(Q(t))(Qe(t + 1) ￿ Q(t)) (11)
We suppose that all the players adopt the cournotian expectations formation hypotesis, i.e.
the static expectations; let q￿i (t) de￿nes the production at time t of the ￿rms other than i,
4q￿i(t) =
Pn
j=1 qj(t) with j 6= i, then the conjectured demand function becomes:
pe
i(t + 1) = f(Q(t)) + f0(Q(t))(qi(t + 1) + qe
￿i(t + 1) ￿ Q(t)) (12)
where qe
￿i(t+1) is the expectation by the i-th ￿rm about the production in period t+1 by the
other ￿rms. According to cournotian hypotesis of static expectation ￿rm i expects that other
￿rms will produce the quantity of the previous period: qe
￿i(t+1) = q￿i(t) =
n X
j=1
qj(t) with j 6= i,
then eq.(12) becomes:
pe









i(t + 1) = f(Q(t)) + f0(Q(t))(qi(t + 1) ￿ qi(t)) (14)
In ￿g.1 we represent the market conditions, (Q(t);p(t)) and the outcome of the learning
process:
Figure 1. Conjecured demand function
The producers are quantity setting, so at each time period t they decide the next period
production qi(t + 1) by maximizing the expected pro￿t at period t + 1, ￿e
i(t + 1):
qi(t + 1) = arg max
qi(t+1)
￿e
i(t + 1) = arg max
qi(t+1)
[pe
i(t + 1)qi(t + 1) ￿ ciqi(t + 1)] (15)




= f(Q(t)) + 2qi(t + 1)f0(Q(t) ￿ qi(t)f0(Q(t)) ￿ ci = 0 (16)
It is easily veri￿ed the second order condition.
If the dynamics of the system are based upon the best response function, the evolution of
the quantities produced by the ￿rms is de￿ned by the following system of ￿rst order nonlinear
di⁄erence equations:




















4 Dynamic analysis of the Puu model with boundedly rational
agents
In this section we consider a duopoly model in which the demand function is the isoelastic one.
The model (17) with n = 2 and demand function (1) becomes a two dimensional dynamical
system, de￿ned by the iterated map:
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The relationship between the stationary equilibrium of the map (18) and the Nash equilib-
rium of the corresponding static duopoly game is de￿ned by the following proposition given by
Bischi et al. [1]:











According to Propos.1 the stationary state q￿ is also the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot
duopoly game with isoelastic demand function. We can note that the steady state (19) is the
same of the Puu duopoly model (4).
6The main result of our work concerns the global stability of the Nash equilibrum:
Proposition 2 The dynamical system (18) is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof Let us introduce the auxiliary variable S(t) de￿ned as the aggregate production at each
time period t: S(t) = q1(t) + q2(t). Now, summing up the left hand sides and the right hand
sides of the equations forming the system (18) we obtain the three-dimensional system:
T1 :
8
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The third equation of the system (20) implies that the aggregate production of a period
only depends on its value on the previous period. In particular, the right hand side of the
third equation represents a concave parabola with two ￿xed points: the trivial one S￿
0 = 0






Figure 2. The aggregate production
The positive steady state S￿
1 is always located on the increasing branch of the parabola
(i.e. S￿
1 is lower than the maximum point Smax = 3
2(c1+c2)) and this implies that it is globally
asymptotically stable. In fact, if the initial condition is located on the region I (0 < S < S￿
1)
the function is located above the diagonal, where S(t + 1) > S(t), and the succession of the
values of the aggregated production is bounded by S￿
1:The monotonicity and the boundedness
7are su¢ cient conditions to conclude that starting from I the sequence of aggregate production
converge monotonically to S￿
1. If S0 is located inside the region III (S > (S￿
1)￿1) then in
period 1 the aggregate production will be a value belonging to the region I and from there we
have seen that the convergence is monotonic to the positive steady state. For the region II
the mechanism is analogue to the one used for the region I, with the only di⁄erence that the
monotonic convergence is decreasing.
This implies that the line S = S￿
1, which is mapped into itself by T1, is globally attracting
for the trajectories of T1. In other words, the limit set of any trajectory of the map T1 belongs
to the trapping line S = S￿
1 (line of !-limit set) and is an invariant set of the restriction of T1
to such line, which can be identi￿ed with the two one-dimensional linear maps (limiting maps):























The steady states of the limit maps are q￿
1 and q￿
2 respectively and they are both globally
asymptotically stable, in fact the lines on the right hand side of T!1 and T!2 have both a slope
equal to 0:5.￿
This result implies that, di⁄erently from the Puu￿ s model, even if the di⁄erence between the
marginal costs of the ￿rms is quite marked, their productions will always converge to the Nash
equilibrium, i.e. a lower degree of rationality increases the stability of the system. In particular,
the production at each time period is given by the following proposition:




















where q1(0) and q2(0) are the production in the initial period and zs(k) = S(k)(1 ￿ S(k)cs)=2
for s = 1;2.
Proof Using again the aggregate production variable S(t) we can rewrite the map (18) in the
following manner:

















8If we introduce a new variable zs(t) ￿ S(t)(1 ￿ S(t)cs)=2 the system becomes:
￿q1(t + 1) =
q1(t)
2 + z1(t)




which is a system formed by a couple of non-autonomous ￿rst-order linear di⁄erence equations
of the form: qs(t+1) = aqs(t)+zs(t) ,with a = 1=2 and s = 1;2 and from which the trajectories
(22) derive.￿
5 The dynamics of quantities and pro￿t functions: an example
In this section we propose an example in which we analyze the evolution of the quantities chosen
by the oligopolists. We are also going to show how the ￿rms build every period an approximation
of the demand function and an approximation of the pro￿t function. With our numerical exercise
we intend to show, step by step, how local approximation of the demand function operates in
the particular case of a Cournot duopoly game (n = 2) with an isoelastic demand function:




together with linear cost functions:
Ci(t) = ciqi; i = 1;2 (26)
we can substitute the demand function (25) and the cost function (26) into (18) to obtain the
reaction functions.
Let us consider the case in which producers have di⁄erent marginal costs, in particular:
c1 = 0:8 and c2 = 0:6. The Nash equilibrium, according to (19), is q￿ ’ [0:3061;0:4081], so the
equilibrium quantity of the ￿rm 1 is lower than the competitor one, and this is a consequence
of the di⁄erence between their marginal costs (c1 > c2). This case clearly violates the condition
(8) for the stability of the Nash equilibrium in the Puu model. Proposition 2 tells us that this
is not the case in our model in which the equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable. Let us
compare the two di⁄erent dynamics.
Suppose that at the initial period (t = 0) we have:
q1(0) = 0:4 > q￿
1 ; q2(0) = 0:1 < q￿
2 (27)
9so ￿rm 1 produces more than its Nash equilibrium quantity, whereas ￿rm 2 produces less





At the end of the initial period, the ￿rms make their expectations on the next period (t = 1).
Let us consider ￿rm 1. Its real pro￿t depends on the quantities produced by both the
competitors:




in particular, in the initial period, we can substitute the value of the initial choice of the





We can see that q1 = q1(0) = 0:4 does not maximize (30) but this is not surprising because the
initial conditions are not the results of a decision process of the ￿rms.
At the end of the period ￿rm 1 knows the value of the partial derivative of the demand






(q1(t) + q2(t))2 =) f1(0) = ￿
1
(q1(0) + q2(0))2 = ￿4 (31)
which can be used to compute the expected price for the period 1 according to (10):
pe
1(1) = p(0) + f1(0)(q1 ￿ q1(0)) = 2 ￿ 4(q1 ￿ 0:4) = 3:6 ￿ 4q1 (32)
so the price expected by ￿rm 1 only depends on its own quantity and does not depend on
the expectation concerning the competitor￿ s quantity. Firm 1 can use (32) to obtain its pro￿t
for the period 1:
￿e
1(1) = pe
1(1)q1 ￿ c1q1 = ￿4q2
1 + 2:8q1 (33)
The expected pro￿t function (33) has a maximum in the point q1 = 0:35 which is the
quantity chosen by the ￿rm 1 for the period 1 (q1(1)). The real pro￿t obtained by the ￿rm 1
at the time t = 1, depends on the quantity chosen by the concurrent ￿rm which, following the









(q1(1) + q2(1))2 = ￿3:0246 (35)
and use it to forecasts the price for the next period (t = 2):
pe
1(2) = p(1) + f1(1)(q1 ￿ q1(0)) = 1:739 ￿ 3:0246(q1 ￿ 0:35) = 2:79761 ￿ 3:0246q1 (36)
which gives rise to this expected pro￿t function:
￿e
1(2) = pe
1(2)q1 ￿ c1q1 = ￿3:0246q2
1 + 1:99761q1 (37)
Now, in order to calculate the real pro￿t obtained by the ￿rm 1, we need to know the quantity






Also in this period the quantity chosen by the ￿rm 1 (q1(2)) is not the optimum choice
given the quantity produced by the concurrent, but is closer than the previous-period one to the
Nash-equilibrium quantity.
If we continue to repeat this mechanism, we observe that, after some periods, the quantity
produced by the ￿rm 1 converges to the Nash-equilibrium quantity. Also the expected pro￿t
function converges to a ￿nal function (￿nal expected pro￿t function).
In ￿g. 3 (a,b) we can see, on the plane (q1;￿1) and on the 3D space (q1;q2;￿1), the quantities
chosen by ￿rm 1 in the ￿rst three periods and at the end of the process. In ￿g. 4 (a,b) we have
the corresponding situation of the ￿rm 2. We can also see the expected pro￿t functions (￿e(t)
is the short form for the expected pro￿t of the ￿rm 1 in ￿g.3 and for the ￿rm 2 in ￿g.4) and the
section of the real pro￿t function corresponding to the quantity chosen by the ￿rms in the ￿rst
three periods and at the end of the process (￿(t) is the short form for ￿1jq2=q2(t) in ￿g.3 and the
short form for￿2jq1=q1(t) in ￿g.4).
11Figure 3: Expected and real pro￿t functions for the ￿rm 1
12Figure 4: Expected and real pro￿t functions for the ￿rm 2
The point A corresponds to the initial condition and is also the point in which the section
of the pro￿t function corresponding to the initial choice of the competitor is tangent to the
expected pro￿t function for the next period; in other words ￿rms think that continuing to
produce the same quantities they obtain also the same pro￿t (this because every ￿rm expects
that the competitor will not change its choice). This is true every time period. The point B is
the point in which ￿rm 1 supposes it will be in the period 1, whereas the point B0 is the point in
13which it really is in that period. Points C and C0 have the same meaning for the period 2. The
curve ￿NE is the section of the pro￿t function corresponding to the Nash Equilibrium quantity
of the competitor and ￿e
NE is the ￿nal expected pro￿t function. These two curves have the same
maximum point (which is the Nash Equilibrium quantity) and the same maximum value (the
real pro￿t when the two ￿rms produce their Nash Equilibrium quantities). In the next section
we try to generalize this result.
6 Comparison between expected pro￿t functions. The case of
isoelastic demand function
In this section we compare the expected pro￿ts of ￿rms which know the real shape of the demand
function with the pro￿ts corresponding to ￿rms that operate under local approximation of the
demand function. We consider again the case in which the demand function is isoelastic.
In both cases we consider, like in the previous sections, the case of na￿ve expectations. Before
we proceed it could be useful to underscore that ￿rms have to make an expectation both on the
shape of the demand function and on the production of the competitor. We analyze the case in
which ￿rms adopt na￿ve expectations concerning the competitor￿ s output but in one case they
also need to estimate the demand function (using local approximation), so the comparison is
between the classic Cournot-Puu model and our boundedly rational agent model.
6.1 Expected pro￿ts in the Cournot-Puu model
At each time period t, ￿rm 1 (for the ￿rm 2 we only need to invert 1 and 2 in what follows)
builds an expected pro￿t function for the period t + 1, given the outputs and the price realized
in t:
￿e
1(t + 1) = pe
1(t + 1)q1(t + 1) ￿ C1(q1(t + 1)) (39)
where C1(q1) is a generic cost function.
In the Cournot-Puu model the ￿rm knows the shape of the demand function, so using na￿ve
expectations we have:
pe
1(t + 1) =
1
q1(t + 1) + q2(t)
(40)
Substituting the expected price (40) in the expected pro￿t function (39) we obtain:
￿e
1;CP(t + 1) =
q1(t + 1)
q1(t + 1) + q2(t)
￿ C1(q1(t + 1)) (41)
146.2 Expected pro￿ts with local approximation of the demand function
Let us consider now the case in which ￿rms don￿ t know the shape of the demand function and,
at each time period t, use realized outputs and price to build a linear approximation of the
demand curve.
In this case, according to (14), the expected price is:
pe




q1(t + 1) ￿ q1(t)
[q1(t) + q2(t)]
2 (42)
Using the expected price (42) in the expected pro￿t function (39), we obtain:
￿e









q1(t + 1) ￿ C1(q1(t + 1)) (43)
6.3 The comparison


















A ￿rst consideration is that the di⁄erence does not depend on the shape of the cost function
(if the costs of each ￿rm only depends on its own output).
A second (and more obvious) consideration is that ￿ = 0 if q1(t + 1) = 0. In particular in
both the cases, ￿rms know that their revenue is 0 if they don￿ t produce at all.
More interesting is the analysis with positive production. After some algebraic manipulation
(and excluding the case q1(t + 1) = 0) we can easily prove that:
￿ ￿ 0 , g(q1(t + 1)) ￿ 0 (45)
with g(q1(t + 1)) = (q1(t + 1))2 ￿ 2q1(t + 1)q1(t) + (q1(t))2.
The convex parabola g(q1(t+1)) is tangent to the horizontal axis in the point q1(t+1) = q1(t)
and positive for all the other value of q1(t + 1). So we can conclude that:
Proposition 4 Given an isoelastic demand function and na￿ve expectations, the pro￿ts expected
by a ￿rm that knows the shape of the real demand function, are higher then the ones expected by
the same ￿rm if it does not know the demand function and approximate it using local approxi-
mation. The expected pro￿ts are the same only if q1(t + 1) = 0 or q1(t + 1) = q1(t).
15In the next section we prove that this result is the consequence of the convexity of the
isoelastic demand function and that the result does not change using another convex demand
function.
7 Comparison between expected pro￿t functions. The case of a
generic convex demand function
What we have found for the isoelastic demand function is caused by its convexity. We can prove
it in a graphic way:
Figure 5: Comparison between expected pro￿ts
As we have seen in the previous section the di⁄erence between expected pro￿t functions does
not depend on the costs, so we can consider a case without them.
In the ￿rst picture we can see that if the ￿rm 1 produce at time t + 1 the same output
produced in t, the rectangles, whose area measures the pro￿ts in the Cournot-Puu and in the
local approximation case are coincident and this happens because the two curves are tangent in
that point.
The second picture represents the case in which ￿rm 1 produces in t + 1 an higher quantity
of output with respect to the previous period t. In this case, the convexity of the demand
function makes higher the height of the rectangle whose area measure the expected pro￿t in
16the Cournot-Puu case, whereas the base is the same in both cases. It is easy to see that
this is caused both by the convexity of the demand function and the linearity of the expected
demand function in the local approximation case. In fact, given that the curves are tangent for
q1(t + 1) = q1(t), for all the other values of q1(t + 1) the convex curve is higher then the linear
one (by de￿nition of convexity). So the same happens for all the (positive) values of q1(t + 1)
except for q1(t + 1) = q1(t) .
The isoelastic demand function introduced by Puu is a convex function so the result of the
previous section is just a consequence of it.
We could easily show that if the demand function is concave then the expected pro￿t in the
local approximation case will be always higher then in the Cournot case (except for q1(t + 1) =
q1(t)).
8 Conclusions
Our work moves from a well known duopoly model with isoelastic demand function in which the
￿rms are endowed with na￿ve expectations (Puu-Cournot duopoly). In that case for values of the
ratio between the marginal costs that are su¢ ciently high or low, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
loses stability via ￿ ip bifurcation, so we can ￿nd locally stable period cycles or even a chaotic
attractor.
In this study we modify the assumptions concerning the rationality of the ￿rms. In particular,
we propose a repeated game in which ￿rms are endowed with a lower degree of rationality and
a lower information set than the Puu-Cournot ￿rms. Firms get the correct local estimate of
the demand function and then they use such estimate for a linear approximation of the demand
function. On the basis of this subjective demand function they solve their pro￿t maximization
problem.
We prove that under these alternative assumptions the unique steady state is globally as-
ymptotically stable for any possible con￿guration of the marginal costs. This result implies that
a decreasing in degree of rationality, in this case, does not lead to a destabilization of the model
but it has the opposite stabilizing e⁄ect.
We also compare the expected pro￿t function of the ￿rms in both cases, proving that for
(almost) all the expected values of the output of the concurrent ￿rm, the duopolists, in our model,
expect an higher pro￿t than the Puu-Cournot ones. An exception is given by the expected pro￿t
on the Nash equilibrium in which they are both equal to the real one and they both maximize
17the respective expected pro￿t function. We generalize these results to all models with convex
demand function.
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